Courses

Human beings, like all other living things, are the product of evolutionary processes that have shaped our bodies and also our psychology and with it the way we interact with other human beings. Although both features are found in other living things, cooperative behavior and cultural learning play a bigger role in human behavior than for most other organisms and underlay much of what we consider uniquely human. The course will be focused on exploration of the application of evolutionary ideas to understanding aspects of human culture and human behavior and the philosophical consequences of those ideas. After an introduction to evolutionary theory the course will be focused on two main themes: (1) the implications of evolutionary thinking for understanding human social behavior and the implications for ethics of these accounts; (2) evolutionary understanding of communication including language.

Prof.: Dave Hilbert

Lecture: TR 11-12:15 PM

In contemporary philosophy much use is made of technical machinery of various sorts. Many topics in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of science, for example, rely on a familiarity with tools from logic, mathematics, probability theory, etc. In this course we will focus on developing a good understanding of these tools.

Prof.: Nick Huggett

Lecture: TR 12:30-1:45 PM

The problem of evil is one of the most formidable challenges facing traditional theism. How could a God that is all knowing, all-powerful, and completely good allow events like earthquakes and pandemics to occur that kill hundreds of thousands of people? How could such a God allow thousands of children to die every day from starvation and fail to prevent atrocities like the Holocaust? In this course we will study different historical treatments of the problem of evil, with a focus on two figures from the modern period: Pierre Bayle, and G. W. Leibniz. We will also try to discern the extent to which particular figures’ approaches to the problem of evil are grounded in their broader epistemological and metaphysical commitments.

Prof.: John Whipple

Lecture: MW 9:30-10:45 AM

What makes inequality unjust? Is it always unjust? And what do we mean by “equality” anyway? Should we even be thinking about equality when we think about justice? We will start off with Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, and then move on to a variety of relatively contemporary authors. We’ll also look at some empirical studies, especially from the world of education.

Prof.: Anthony Laden

Lecture: T 3:30-6 PM

This seminar will be on Kant’s Third Critique, in particular his account of aesthetic and teleological judgments, with an eye to understanding what unifies the work as a whole.  It will not presuppose prior knowledge of Kant’s philosophy.

Prof.: Daniel Sutherland

Seminar: M 1:30-3:30 PM

This seminar will explore method in the history of philosophy.  We will consider such questions as whether the history of philosophy is properly a part of philosophy at all – and if so, how and why it is – what its relationship is to intellectual history, and to what degree historians of philosophy should attend to the context and/or intentions of the authors of the works they study, rather than the intrinsic merits of their arguments.  We will also invite the members of our Department who do history of philosophy, to some degree or other, to come to the seminar and share with us how they see their work in this area and what methods they use.

Prof.: Samuel Fleischacker

Seminar: TR 3:30-6 PM

Prof.: Nick Huggett

Seminar: T 3:30-6 PM

What is the difference between those events in a person’s history that manifest agency and those that she merely undergoes? When and why are we accountable/ responsible for our actions? When and how do factors like coercion, deception, and ignorance reduce or remove autonomy and/or accountability? Do autonomous agency and moral responsibility require “freedom of the will”? Are they compatible with what science teaches us about the universe and about ourselves?

Prof. Will Small | T 3:30-6 PM | BSB 113

Ludwig Wittgenstein was one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th Century. His later philosophy is notoriously difficult to interpret. Though its topics are of central concern to “analytic” philosophy, it is written in seemingly loosely connected, often cryptic, remarks. In this course we will closely examine the later Wittgenstein’s contributions to the philosophy of language. We will explore his rejection of the “Augustinian” picture of language, his introduction of the idea of a “language game,” his argument that there could not be a “private language,” his discussion of the nature of “rule-following,” and his discussion of certainty and scepticism. In addition to reading primary texts, and commentaries on them, we look at the work of contemporary philosophers who have picked up Wittgensteinian themes and problems.

Aidan Gray | TR 2-3:15 | BSB 269

This course will first consider ways in which Western philosophers have reacted to and/or been impacted by colonialism, since 1500 – whether speaking up against it or subtly or not so subtly building colonialist attitudes into their moral and political views – then turn to examine the notion of colonialism itself and ask how it should be defined. Readings from Francesco de Vitoria, John Locke, Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, Charles Mills, and others.

Prof. Sam Fleischacker | R 3:30-6 PM | LH 215

Practice in philosophical writing including finding a thesis. Judicious choice of reading on the topic, outlining, and composing drafts as well as style, paragraphing, and making sentences. Required of all first year Ph.D. students. Course Information: Prerequisite(s): Graduate standing in philosophy.

Sam Fleischacker | T 3:30-6PM | UH 1430

This seminar will focus on the metaphysics of personal identity.  We will look at the major positions and debates on these topics, starting with Locke and then moving on to the development and discussion of neo-Lockean psychological accounts in the latter half of the 20th century, followed by debates between present-day biological views (“Animalism”) and “Constitution” views (which see human persons as inherently psychological beings constituted by human animals).  Along the way we will also review some alternative approaches (e.g., narrative, enactivist, and no-self views).  Time permitting, we will investigate in more detail two concepts standardly associated with personal identity: memory and diachronic self-experience.  There have been several recent empirical and metaphysical developments connected to each of these concepts and we will consider what, if anything, they imply for debates about personal identity.  Throughout we will return repeatedly to the question of the extent to which metaphysical investigations of personhood and personal identity necessarily involve ethical or practical considerations.

Marya Schechtman | F 2:00-4:30 | UH 1430

Manipulability or interventionist theories of causation and causal explanation have become prominent in both philosophy of science and in statistics over the last two decades. According to these theories a cause is a tool or device for producing an effect. Although the idea that causes are interventions that produce change in a system is an old one we will be focusing on how this idea was developed starting in the early 2000s in both statistics and philosophy. In both cases, the concept of a cause as something that allows manipulation of a system to produce an effect was developed in a way that is non-reductionist and that does not tie causes to human actions. The focus in the first part of the course will be on the manipulability theory as developed by James Woodward (and also some work by Pearl) and also consider criticisms and alternatives to it. One of the claims for manipulability theories is that they provide a framework for understanding causation and causal explanation in sciences like biology and cognitive science in which the kind of invariant laws found in the physical sciences are unavailable. We will look at the application of the manipulability theory to cases in biology and cognitive science and try to evaluate its helpfulness in understanding work in the special sciences. Time permitting we will look at causation in the social sciences, particularly economics. No particular background is assumed and although some ideas from statistics will be relevant our discussion will remain on a non-technical level

David Hilbert | R 3:30-6 | UH 1430

Is knowing how to do something (e.g. how to drive stick) simply a matter of knowing facts about it? Or does it require having the ability to do it? What is the relationship between know-how and skill? In what sense is know-how a kind of practical knowledge? And how can we acquire it?

Prof. Will Small | R 3:30-6 PM

The course will provide an overview of philosophy as it was practiced during the Middle Ages in the Latin-speaking West. The work of authors such as Augustine, Aquinas, Ockham, and Kilvington will be explored on topics ranging from the nature of change to compatibility of reason and religion.

Prof Georgette Sinkler | MW 9:30-10:45 AM

The idea that we should always promote the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people has been probably the most popular nonreligious moral system in the world, for the past 200 years. We will explore both its advantages and its (many) problems in this class. Readings from Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Aldous Huxley, Bernard Williams and John Rawls.

Prof. Sam Fleischacker | T 3:30-6 PM

Prof. John Whipple | M 1-3:30 PM

Proponents of intersectionality emphasize that it is critical, both theoretically and politically, to attend to the ways in which axes of identity and oppression (e.g. race, class, gender, and sexuality) intersect. But while intersectionality has become central to critical work in many fields, it has also proven difficult to define. This seminar will explore and attempt to gain some clarity on core intersectional notions like simultaneity, inseparability, and mutual constitution, with an eye to understanding the importance of these notions for philosophy. We will also delve into some of the theoretical debates about intersectionality, pursuing questions such as: Does intersectionality fragment social groups? What level of analysis does intersectionality operate on? Must intersectionality be connected to a broader theory of social power to have explanatory value?

Prof. Annette Martín | Thursdays 3:30-6 PM

What is the nature of perceptual experience and how does it relate us to the world? We ordinarily think that we directly perceive the objects in our environment. Many have thought, however, that illusions and hallucinations raise serious problems for our ordinary understanding. Philosophers have developed a variety of theories of perceptual experience to address these problems. We will read literature from classic work by Elizabeth Anscombe to recent work by Susanna Siegel, and consider accounts of the nature of experience and perception up to the present day, including the Sense-Datum, Adverbial, Intentionalist, and Naïve Realist theories. We may also explore related issues, e.g. the nature of color, or the extent to which concepts play a role in perception.

Professor Daniel Sutherland | T 3:30-6 PM

We will address a cluster of interrelated questions in meta-physics, focusing on two topics: (1) The metaphysics of personal identity. What makes you the same person you were 20 years ago? Are you the same person you were 20 years ago? Do people really persist over time or is the sense that they do an illusion? (2) The metaphysics of memory. Memory has usually been addressed by philosophers within other debates about, e.g., knowledge, the nature of consciousness, or personal identity. Recently, in part because of important developments in the scientific study of memory, the philosophy of memory has become an important area in its own right, focusing mostly on questions about what makes something a memory and how memory connects us to the past. We will look at fast developing debates in this area and consider how the two topics interact.

Professor Marya Schectman | T 3:30-6 PM

Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment is a remarkable book, comprising an addition to Kant’s earlier views of knowledge, a theory of beauty, a theory of “natural purposes,” a theory of the worth of human life, and (in the light of all this) a theory of religion. We will work through the text slowly, using some secondary sources, and ask ourselves how much of it remains of value to our thinking about art, science, and religion today.

Professor Samuel Fleischacker | R 3:30-6 PM

Can hip hop be a form of protest? Should we speak up about injustice even if it won’t cause change? Is there any role for philosophy in changing the social world? We will consider these and other questions as we undertake a philosophical analysis of oppression, resistance, and social change.

Professor Annette Martín | TR 2-3:15 PM

Professor Tony Laden, Friday 2-430

Professor Justin Vlasits, Monday 1-3:30

Justin Vlasits, F 2-4:30

No prior knowledge of ancient philosophy will be presupposed.

Daniel Sutherland, R 3:30-6

The general topic is Kant’s idealism, but it will not be exclusively about Kant’s idealism, and I will teach it differently from the way I usually teach history seminars.   We will approach the topic through the lens of different forms of mind-dependence. It will differ from other seminars I have taught in taking account of recent metaphysical treatments of mind-dependence, such as accounts of response-dependent properties and theories of perception – e.g. relationalism and direct theories of perception.  This recent philosophy has inspired a new approach to Kant’s idealism, a more realistic one that understands idealism as an account of how the world of experience is mind-dependent while allowing the world a mind-independent reality.  In what sense and to what degree is our experience of the world mind-dependent?  (We will not, however, directly engage the work of John McDowell and Kantian conceptualism.)  The idea is to locate Kant interpretations in a larger philosophical framework.  Some of the recent work on mind-dependent properties has focused on color, so we may look at that literature as well.

David Hilbert, T 3:30-6

Human societies involve cooperation between human beings in many different ways and on many different spatial and temporal scales. And there is compelling evidence that the richly cooperative nature of current human societies isn’t a recent development but has been present for a very long time among modern humans and some of their ancestors. These facts raise a set of interesting questions about whether there is something special about human cooperation that makes it different from that found among other social animals and, if there is something special, why those special features are found only among humans . The class will focus on the evolution of human cooperation and the issues that come up in attempting to understand cooperation among human beings and how it came to have the features it currently has. We will touch on issues in philosophy of biology, philosophy of social science, philosophy of mind and ethics broadly conceived.

Professor Nicholas Huggett | TR 3:30-4:45 PM

This course will teach formal methods and concepts for use in philosophy: including set theory, probability theory, computability, and issues of soundness and completeness in logic and arithmetic.

Professor John Whipple | MW 9:30-10:45 AM

The problem of evil is one of the most formidable challenges facing traditional theism. How could a God that is all-knowing, all powerful, and completely good allow something like a pandemic to occur that kills hundreds of thousands of people? In this course we will study different historical treatments of the problem of evil, with a focus on three figures from the modern period: Nicolas Malebranche, Pierre Bayle, and G. W. Leibniz. However, we will begin the course by looking at medieval figure Moses Maimonides’ fascinating approach to the problem of evil, and near the end of the seminar we will consider Voltaire’s famous criticisms of traditional rationalist responses to the problem. We will conclude the course by looking selections from a recent monograph by Jill Graper Hernandez: Early Modern Women and the Problem of Evil: Atrocity and Theodicy. As we consider these figures’ remarks on the problem of evil, we will try to discern the extent to which particular figures’ approaches to the problem of evil are grounded in their broader epistemological and metaphysical commitments. We will also be paying careful attention to some of the interpretive challenges we face when trying to make sense of difficult texts like Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed, Bayle’s Historical and Critical Dictionary, and Leibniz’s Theodicy.

Professor Sam Fleischacker | M 1:00 – 3:30PM

What’s the relationship between belief in God and morality? Does morality depend on a belief in God? (Is it true, as Dostoevsky said, that if there’s no God, everything is permitted?). If not, is there anything that a belief in God might add to morality? We’ll consider these questions, first, in the work of Immanuel Kant, who kept morality and religion largely apart from one another, and afterwards in the writing of some contemporary Christian philosophers, especially Robert Adams, who presents a theistic ethics in his book Fine and Infinite Goods.

Professor Anthony Laden | MW 9:30-10:45 AM

John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, published in 1971, is arguably the most important work of political philosophy published in the last century. It still drives much of the debate in political philosophy. It is also an elegant piece of philosophy, unfolding a single argument over 500 pages. This class will spend all semester working through Rawls’s work, providing students a chance to understand both its details and its sweep. Prerequisite: A Philosophy class at the 200level or approval of the instructor.

Professor Samuel Fleischacker, Thursdays, 1:00 – 3:30 pm

Professor Marya Schechtman, Fridays, 2:00 – 4:30 pm

Topic: Issues in the Philosophy of Memory

Memory is not a new topic in philosophy. Theories of memory have been offered in a wide range of traditions, and memory is implicated in philosophical discussions of personal identity, moral responsibility, knowledge, and other topics.  In the past decade or so, however, the philosophy of memory has coalesced into a distinct subfield.  This is partly due to a series of results in the scientific study of memory, which have both provided new perspectives on traditional philosophical questions and made them more urgent. In this course we will look at some of the key issues in the metaphysics of memory to get a sense of the general state of this rapidly developing field.  Topics include the taxonomy of memory; memory as a natural kind; the content(s) of memory; causal and post-causal theories of memory; memory traces; memory and time; memory errors; the relation between memory and imagination; memory and personal identity; memory and affect; and extended and collective memory. Many of these topics are closely intertwined, and part of the aim of the seminar will be to understand their connections better.  Readings are from sources employing a broad variety of philosophical methodologies and perspectives.

Professor Nick Huggett, Tuesdays, 3:30 – 6:00 pm

This seminar will be a survey of philosophy of physics, with special attention to its metaphysical implications — and the historical importance of philosophy to physics, and vice versa. We will use Maudlin’s two recent Philosophy of Physics texts, starting with spacetime: we will consider Newton’s absolute space and Leibniz’s relationism, and how debates concerning the nature of space and geometry change with the discovery of spacetime, and how such issues have been considered by philosophers in recent years (including my own work employing humean supervenience). We will also discuss the nature of time: the relation of time to space, the question of time travel; and the direction of time. Finally we will consider quantum mechanics, especially Schrödinger’s famous cat, non-separability and the humean mosaic, the identity of indiscernibles — and hopefully a short introduction to the emergence of spacetime in quantum gravity.

No substantial background in physics is assumed, though those bringing such a background will be able to work on more technical topics if they wish.

Professor Georgette Sinkler, Mondays, 1:00 – 3:30 pm

Intensive study of special topics in medieval philosophy. Course Information: May be repeated with approval. Approval to repeat course granted by the department. Students may register for more than one section per term when topics vary.
4.000 Credit hours

Professor Stephen Engelmann, Wednesdays, 4:00 – 6:30 pm.

A graduate introduction to Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment theories of politics and society in the North Atlantic world. Course Information: Same as POLS 504. Prerequisite(s): Consent of the department required for non-degree graduate students.
4.000 Credit hours

Professor Anne Eaton, Fridays, 1:00 – 3:30 pm

PHL 530: Games

What are we doing when we play games? Is this an aesthetic activity? Are games like artworks, or like fictional stories, or like sports, or like social practices, or ways of communicating? What is the value of games? What ethical norms apply to games? Is it wrong to play games that center on, or even just involve, committing actions that would be morally wrong in our world, even if they are not morally wrong in the world of the game? Such questions are receiving a lot of attention in the field of aesthetics/philosophy of art these days. We will be reading most or all of two recent books: Thi Nguyen’s Games: Agency as Art (OUP 2020) and Christopher Bartel’s Video Games, Violence, and the Ethics of Fantasy (Bloomsbury 2020). We will also read a couple of essays by Stephanie Patridge on gender and video games.

Course Information: May be repeated with approval. Approval to repeat course granted by the department. Students may register for more than one section per term when topics vary.
4.000 Credit hours

Professor Will Small, Thursdays, 3:30 – 6:00 pm

PHIL 536: Know-how
Knowing how to do something is typically regarded as practical knowledge. One important question is whether it consists, ultimately, in propositional knowledge. According to intellectualism, it does: know-how’s status as practical does not preclude its being propositional, and its status as knowledge requires it. Influential attacks on intellectualism by, among others, Gilbert Ryle and Hubert Dreyfus led many philosophers in the second half of the 20th-century to reject the view. But the 21st-century has seen an intellectualist revival. We will consider Ryle’s and Dreyfus’s arguments, and those of the 21st-century defenders and critics of intellectualism. We will also compare contemporary conceptions of know-how with the Ancient Greek conception of technê. Questions to be considered include: What is the role of know-how in the explanation of intelligent action? Does knowing how to do something constitutively involve having the ability to do it? How do we acquire know-how? How does thinking about know-how affect our more general understanding of knowledge? Does know-how consist in propositional knowledge? And does the previous question deserve the central place given to it over the last 70 years? Readings from: Plato, Aristotle, Ryle, Dreyfus, Davidson, McDowell, Stanley (& Williamson), Pavese, Fridland, Cath, Farkas, Kremer, Hyman, and more.

Course Information: May be repeated with approval. Approval to repeat course granted by the department. Students may register for more than one section per term when topics vary.
4.000 Credit hours

Professor Anne Eaton, Thursdays, 5:00 – 6:15 pm

A work-in-progress seminar for graduate students at the topical, prospectus, or dissertation level. Course Information: Satisfactory/Unsatisfactory grading only. May be repeated. Prerequisite(s): Completion of 10 of the 14 required courses for the Ph.D. in Philosophy.
4.000 Credit hours

Professor Daniel Sutherland, Thursdays, 3:30 – 6:00 pm

This course will focus on a priori knowledge. A priori knowledge is knowledge whose justification does not depend on particular sense experiences. Since before Plato, some philosophers have believed that we can know truths, even substantive truths about the world, simply by reflecting or reasoning. Candidates for a priori knowledge have included mathematics, logic, ethics, and some metaphysics. But what are its properties? Is it possible to have any a priori knowledge at all, and if so, what kind of knowledge? We will explore these issues from both a historical and contemporary perspective.  This course is SYNCHRONOUS ONLINE.

Professor Rachel Goodman, Tuesdays, 3:30 – 6:00 pm

The branch of philosophy of language known as ‘theory of reference’ addresses questions about the way that language refers to things in the world. In this course on the theory of reference, we will ask how different kinds of expressions (for example, names, descriptions, natural kind terms) pick out their objects, and what kind of meaning they have. Our discussion of these questions will begin with foundational texts of the late 19th century and early 20th century, and end with contemporary discussions of issues such as the nature of first-person reference, and role of internal states and external contextual factors in determining the meaning and reference of our terms. This course is SYNCHRONOUS ONLINE.

Professor Joshua Norton, Tuesdays/Thursdays, 9:30 – 10:45 am

This course will teach formal methods and concepts for use in philosophy including set theory, probability theory, computability, and issues of soundness and completeness in logic & arithmetic. This course is SYNCHRONOUS ONLINE.

Professor David Hilbert, Mondays/Wednesdays, 9:30 – 10:45 am

The course will be focused on exploration of the philosophical systems of Margaret Cavendish and George Berkeley. Both Cavendish and Berkeley deal with a wide range of questions but both focused much of their work on responding to the 17th century revolution in philosophy and science that focused on explaining natural phenomena in terms of underlying physical mechanisms. Both were also outsiders to the main philosophical community of their time, Cavendish as a woman and Berkeley as Irish, and both rejected central parts of the mechanistic philosophy. Cavendish and Berkeley did not overlap, Berkeley was born a decade after Cavendish’s death, and it’s unlikely that Berkeley was influenced by Cavendish. What they have in common is an intense engagement with the central claims of the mechanical philosophy and the development of interesting and original (and very different) responses to it. This course is online SYNCHRONOUS.

Professor Annette Martin, Tuesdays/Thursdays, 2:00 – 3:15 pm

Can hip hop be a form of protest? Should we speak up about injustice even if it won’t cause change? Do victims have a duty to resist their own oppression? In this course we will consider these and other questions as we undertake a philosophical analysis of oppression, resistance, and social change. This course is online SYNCHRONOUS.

Professor Aidan Gray, Mondays, 1:00 – 3:00 pm

Practice in philosophical writing including finding a thesis. Judicious choice of reading on the topic, outlining, and composing drafts as well as style, paragraphing, and making sentences. Required of all first year Ph.D. students. Course Information: Prerequisite(s): Graduate standing in philosophy.

Professor Daniel Sutherland, Thursdays, 3:30 – 6:00 pm

Professor Anthony Laden, Tuesdays, 12:30 – 3:00 pm

Our focus this term will be on trust.  Trust enters philosophical conversations in a number of sub-fields: from the epistemology of testimony to ethics and political philosophy.  I am most interested in how to think about trust in social and political relations and institutions and thus its place in a healthy democratic society.  But the seminar will look at trust from a variety of angles, as well as looking at a variety of accounts of what trust is (is it best thought of as a gamble or a gift, for instance), what sorts of benefits and costs there are to trusting others (is it necessary for cooperation? Does it leave us overly vulnerable?) and whether there are institutions, attitudes and social practices that foster trust and trustworthiness and that are fostered by them.  This will be a research seminar in the fullest sense:  I am trying to figure some stuff out here and am hoping to enlist the seminar participants in a joint project of doing so.

Professor Rachel Goodman, Fridays, 2:00 – 4:30 pm

Professor Bailey Szustak, Wednesdays, 3:00 – 3:50 pm

Professor TBD, Wednesdays, 3:30 – 6:00 pm.

This course is about the nature of our minds, and their relationship to our bodies and to the world around us. We’ll ask the following questions: ‘what is a mind?’, ‘what is the relationship between our minds, our brains and our bodies?’, ‘what is consciousness, and what is its role in our minds?’, and ‘how do our minds represent the world around us?’.  Prerequisite: one non-logic 200-level course in philosophy or consent of the instructor.

Professor TBD, Tuesdays 3:30 – 6:00pm.

Selected works on the aims and methods of science; the status of scientific theories, natural laws and theoretical entities; the nature of scientific explanation. Course Information. Prerequisiite(s): One non-logic 200-level course in philosophy or consent of the instructor. Recommended background: PHIL 102.

Professor TBD, Tuesdays and Thursdays, 12:30 – 1:45 pm.

The course will focus on various topics which engaged philosophers in the West prior to the Early Modern Period–topics which sprang from the idea that human beings are rational animals who in virtue of that rationality have certain cognitive abilities as well as certain moral responsibilities. In other words, the course will focus on topics in Epistemology, Logic, and Ethics. Prerequisite(s): One non-logic 200-level course in philosophy or consent of the instructor. Note for Phil Majors: this course can count as either Group 1 or Group 2 in the History of Philosophy.