WIP: Nader Shoaibi, "Logic and the Aim of Truth"
4:00 - 5:30 in Seminar room
Abstract: The idea that logic is in some sense normative for belief or reasoning is well-entrenched in philosophical tradition. According to a standard account, going back to Frege, while logic is to be understood independently from belief and reasoning (as essentially the study of truth preservation), it nevertheless has normative implications for belief in much the same way that any other science does: insofar as truth is the aim of belief, logic can tell us what we should and shouldn’t believe. In this talk, I will attempt to get clear on exactly what this line of thought amounts to. My question is: Can we vindicate logic as having normative implications by appeal to facts about truth or falsity of our doxastic states? My conclusion is skeptical, but it is meant in a positive spirit, pointing the way to a more viable alternative.